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Self-Reflection through Genuine Friends: 
Expanding the Schopenhauerian Conception 
In this paper, I explore the value of solitude for which Arthur Schopenhauer argues in 
Parerga and Paralipomena​ and discuss how his pessimism regarding social interactions is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the concept of friendship. I argue that solitary self-reflection, 
which, per Schopenhauer, is essential to one’s individuality, can be accomplished through 
one’s friends, for a true friend is, as it were, a mirror image of oneself. 
Schopenhauer argues that happiness can only be achieved through being in solitude 
and practicing self-reflection. In reaching this conclusion, he references the Aristotelian 
conception of happiness, in which happiness is equated with self-sufficiency—or, the ability to 
say, with confidence, “omnia mea mecum porto [‘All my possessions I carry with me’]” 
(Schopenhauer: 14). Self-sufficiency, in other words, refers to an individual’s capacity to be 
“lacking in nothing” when in complete isolation and is thus a finally valuable good according 
to both philosophers. Schopenhauer rather sensibly proposes that one can become 
self-sufficient if and only if they learn to become content with living in solitude. Conversely, a 
person who lives sociably and pleasurably in hope of achieving happiness is in error, for this 
lifestyle will prevent one from coming to know oneself fully. Schopenhauer characterizes the 
common, sociable person as having a “vacuity of soul” that drives them to desire social 
intercourse and claims that only an individual of “intellectual superiority” can remove their 
desire for social intercourse and become content with solitude (15-6).  
Schopenhauer believes this to be true as “a man cannot reckon with certainty upon 
anyone but himself,” and thus, when a sociable man inevitably interacts with “a great deal of 
other people who are not of like character with himself, they will exercise a disturbing 
influence upon him, adverse to his peace of mind” (14). These interactions with individuals of 
unlike character are likely to hinder one’s ability to come to know their natural state. For this 
reason, Schopenhauer claims that sociability requires one to surrender their individuality and 
that solitude is beneficial for two reasons: “it allows [a man] to be with himself… and… 
prevents him being with others” (18). When the intellectually superior individual is isolated 
from society, then, they are able to practice meaningful self-reflection in pursuit of 
self-sufficiency. Schopenhauer adds that, because society is essentially disposed to disagreeing 
with one’s true self, “a man can only be himself so long as he is alone” (14). Thus, if an 
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individual becomes content in solitude, they will come to be able to say omnia mea mecum 
porto. 
Schopenhauer’s argument may be illustrated, in a general sense, by Epictetus’ analogy 
of a piece of quenched charcoal placed next to a piece of burning charcoal, which he employs 
in his ​Discourses ​in order to caution his readers of the dangers of frequent social intercourse. 
“Either the quenched charcoal will quench the other,” he explains, “or the burning charcoal 
will light that which is quenched” (Epictetus: 3). That is, when one is frequently in the 
presence of common men, they “must either become like them, or change them to his own 
fashion” (3). Perhaps it is for this reason that Schopenhauer claims that social intercourse may 
“rob [a man] … of himself” (Schopenhauer: 14). Epictetus thus warns us to practice being 
alone in order to become self-sufficient before involving ourselves with common men. His 
reasoning is that, if one first becomes self-sufficient through solitude, then their character will 
be “firm and constant”—their burning light will not be at risk of being quenched (Epictetus: 
2). Although Schopenhauer sees no place for society in one’s life, his and Epictetus’ arguments 
are consistent in that they conclude that solitude is a vehicle for individuality. 
Yet, in his argument for the unparalleled importance of solitude, Schopenhauer makes 
an assertion that I take to be suggestive of the opposite perspective. That is, he states that the 
following is true about the attraction between like-minded individuals: “People of similar 
nature… immediately come to feel a kind of general agreement; and if they are cast very much 
in the same mould, complete harmony or even unison will flow from their intercourse” 
(Schopenhauer: 23). If Schopenhauer believes it to be true that two individuals can be in such 
a state of harmony, then his comments appear to be more consistent than it seems with those 
of other philosophers who, unlike Schopenhauer, argue for the value of friendship. His belief 
that “complete harmony” and, moreover, a perfect accordance of wills can indeed exist 
between two individuals seems to affirm the Ciceronian conception of friendship—that “in 
the face of a true friend a man sees… a second self” (Cicero: 8).  
Cicero’s remark on friendship is echoed by Michel de Montaigne in his essay “Of 
Friendship,” in which Montaigne argues that true friends “mix and work themselves into one 
piece, with so universal a mixture, that there is no more sign of the seam by which they were 
first conjoined” (Montaigne). While Cicero and Montaigne tell us that such harmonious 
interactions are often indicative of true friendships, Alexander Nehamas, in his book ​On 
Friendship​, expands upon this notion of friendship and provides the basis for my extension of 
Schopenhauer’s argument in doing so. 
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Nehamas largely bases his framework for friendship off of Montaigne’s attempt to 
explain why he loved his friend, Étienne de La Boétie, as he did: “If you press me to tell you 
why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed except by answering: Because it was he, 
because it was I” (qtd. in Nehamas: 119). Provided that such harmony exists between friends, 
Nehamas arrives at the conclusion that friendship is good for us because it allows each friend 
to come to know themselves and to develop their own sense of individuality. In other words, 
our self-realization, and thus our individuality, is largely contingent upon the formative nature 
of our true friendships: 
We rely on our friends to listen attentively and sympathetically, though not 
uncritically, to us when we speak freely—often more freely than we speak to 
ourselves—and reveal aspects of ourselves of which we may be suspicious, 
unsure, or even ignorant and which, once revealed, can be cultivated or 
eradicated, as the case may be. (233) 
Because we often present ourselves more authentically to our close friends than we do 
to others or even ourselves, our friends are the most fit to critique our character traits so that 
we may embrace the positive ones and abandon the negative ones. Through the reactions and 
feedback of our friends, therefore, we come to develop our individuality in its entirety. 
Nehamas provides further clarification on this aspect of friendship, stating that it “provide[s] 
the ground on which we can turn all the disparate elements of ourselves... into a more coherent 
and... a more engaging and characteristic whole” (224). Simply put, while Schopenhauer 
believes that social intercourse jeopardizes one’s individuality, Nehamas argues that friendship 
affords one their individuality. 
At first glance, these two arguments regarding friendship and solitude appear to be 
irreconcilable. Based on Nehamas’ account of friendship, however, I believe that genuine 
friendships and self-reflection can be means to a common end: discovering one’s own identity. 
Schopenhauer argues that true self-reflection must occur in solitude and within the individual 
(and would likely respond to my objection accordingly), but self-reflection is an activity purely 
of the mind and soul. If a friend is, as Schopenhauer grants is possible, “cast … in the same 
mould”—so much so that he sees his friend as “another whose spirit he may so blend with his 
own as almost to make one being of two” (Cicero: 26)—then the process that Nehamas 
describes holds the same value as does Schopenhauerian self-reflection. That is to say, if the 
minds and souls of two friends are in complete accordance with each other, then the question 
of solitude is irrelevant; this component of Nehamasian friendship is fundamentally one of 
self-reflection. Finally, if self-reflection is valuable because it acts as a means by which one can 
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come to possess individuality, then Nehamasian friendship is capable of affording one 
individuality. 
Consider two objections to my reconciliation of Schopenhauer’s and Nehamas’ 
arguments regarding individuality. The first is based on the thought that one ought to interact 
with dissimilar individuals in one’s development. There is value in interacting with a variety of 
individuals as doing so allows one’s opinions and beliefs to be both rounded and informed. 
This exposure may be valuable in that it develops an aspect of one’s individuality—their 
perspectives and values regarding worldly matters. In response to this objection, I first 
emphasize that I am not arguing against the value of society as does Schopenhauer. It may be 
the case that friendship and solitude cannot afford one their individuality in its entirety, for 
social intercourse may also be necessary.  Second and at risk of being overly calculative, I am 
inclined to believe that portion of one’s individuality informed by broader society is small in 
comparison to that which is comprised of their character and identity. That is, a rigidity of 
character, as Epictetus suggests, is the largest contributor to one’s individuality. Moreover, if 
one understands their own set of morals, they will come to develop truer perspectives on such 
matters. Socialization, then, may be a contributing factor to a person’s individuality, but 
self-reflection, whether it exists in solitude or between friends, ought to be prioritized. 
The second objection is that it is unreasonable to expect such careful examination of 
each friend by their counterpart. Yet, I do not take Nehamas’ suggestion to be that friends 
ought to engage in explicit discussions regarding each other’s character, morals, and emotions. 
Rather, true friends may achieve this good simply through their casual intercourse, which 
Nehamas seems to believe is evaluative by nature. In my opinion, the magnitude of this good 
can be amplified following a suggestion for friendship that Aristotle proposes in his 
Nicomachean Ethics​. Aristotle considers living together to be the mark of true friendship 
because, as he very reasonably states, “people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and 
do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do” (Aristotle, book 8, 
§5). I believe this same suggestion applies to Nehamasian friendship because living together 
allows one not only to listen to but also to observe their friend as they “speak [and act] freely” 
(Nehamas: 233). Moreover, each friend need not necessarily provide spoken feedback 
regarding the other’s character traits, for the other ought to recognize their counterpart’s 
response to their actions. This, I believe, makes this conception of friendship a more attainable 
one. 
Ultimately, Schopenhauer’s distinction between the intellectually superior and the 
vacuous of soul seems to suggest that only the former can possess individuality. The type of 
person that Schopenhauer considers to be intellectually superior—that is, to have the capacity 
to be perfectly contented by solitude alone and to dispel any desires for social intercourse—is, 
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at least per my experience, rather uncommon. While it may be true that the intellectually 
superior are indeed capable of becoming self-sufficient through solitude, I propose that it may 
also be the case that the common person—whom Schopenhauer considers to be 
vacuous—relies on their close friends to begin to develop their own sense of individuality in 
the way that Nehamas suggests. 
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